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Abstract: This paper presents a variety of ideas about ways in which the
government of Mexico can stimulate a higher rate of saving. These ideas
are building blocks rather than an overail plan. Mexico has recently
replaced its traditional pay-as-you-go social security system with a system
ofmandatory individual pension accounts that is likely to increase national
saving and capital accumulation. The present paper focuses on other tax,
regulatory and government financial policychanges that could increase the
reward, the security and the liquidity ofsavings in ways that would raise
the national saving rate. The design of the individual pension accounts
(the AFORE program) is discussed in the Appendix te this paper.
Resumen: Este artículo presenta una serie de ideas sobre cómo el gobierno
mexicano podría estimular mayores tasas de ahorro. Estas son ideas
separadas y no un plan estructurado en conjunto. México ha reemplazado
recientemente su sistema de pensiones de reparto por un sistema obliga
torio de cuentas individuales, que al parecer debe aumentar el ahorro
nacional y la acumulación de capital. El presente artículo se enfoca sobre
otros impuestos y cambios en la política regulatoria y financiera guberna
mental que podrían aumentar el premio, la seguridad y la liquidez de los
ahorros, de modo que aumente la tasa nacional de ahorro. El diseño del
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sistema de cuentas individuales de pensiones (AFORES) es discutido en un
apéndice.
M
exico’s moderate level ofdomestic saving limits the country’s rate
of investment, restrains its rate of economic growth, and makes
Mexico more vulnerable than it would otherwise be to international
capital shifts of the type that precipitated the December 1994 crisis.’
Although Mexico can anticipate continued inflows offoreign capital in
the years ahead, it needs a higher sustained level ofdomestic saving ifit
is to fulfihi its potential for raising real incomes and the general
standard of living ofthe Mexican people.
In the long run the level of national output depends not on
demand but on Mexico’s capacity to produce. Experience around the
world reminds us that the countries with high rates of capital accu
mulation are the ones that grow more rapidly and that a high level of
domestic saving is necessaryfor more rapid growth ofthe capital stock.
Although international capital flows can supplement domestic saving,
the segmented character ofthe global capital market limits the avail
ability of sustained cross-border capital inflows. Only a country with
a high saving rate can maintain a high investment rate. 2
The precise level ofcapital inflow that can be sustained in Mexico
is uncertain. But experience in other countries indicates that a capital
inflow in excess offive percent of GDP for more than a few years is very
unusual. The recent crisis in Asia shows that large capital inflows and
current account deficits cannot be sustained and are likely to led
to currency crises. If Mexico wants to sustain a higher rate of gross
domestic investment, it will have to raise the domestic saving rate.
Some ofthat increase in saving may now occur spontaneously because
of the reduced net worth and income expectations of Mexican house
holds and the decreased availability ofcredit to household borrowers.
But additional policy changes are likely to be needed to raise saving
by as much as four percent of GDP.
Moreover, a return to the investment rate before the 1994-1995
crisis would still not reflect Mexico’s potential. Mexico’s current in
come level and the investrnent opportunities in Mexico now implythat
a substantially higher rate of saving would permit a substantially
‘My article, “Global Capital Flows: Too Little, Not Too Much”, in the June 24, 1995 issue
ofThe Economist discusses the relation between Mexico’s saving rate and the collapse ofthe peso.
2 For a discussion ofthe reasons for this segmentad global capital market, see M. Feldstein,
1994, pp. 675-697.
higher rate ofinvestment and growth. A higherinitial rate ofdomestic
saving would also initiate a virtuous circle in which higher income
growth leads to even higher saving and the higher domestic saving
rate makes it possible to attract more investment from abroad.
This paper presents a variety of ideas about ways in which the
government of Mexico can stimulate a higher rate of saving. These
ideas are building blocks rather than an overall plan. Sorne are
mutually exclusive but rnost are options that could be combined to
achieve a higherrate ofsaving. Many ofthese ideas have been adopted
in other countries. Although the ernphasis is oil policy options that can
be helpful, 1 will also comment on sorne current proposals that
would be likely to reduce the rate of saving.
This paper does not discuss ways to encourage increased invest
ment in plant and equiprnent. International experience shows that
countries with high saving rates do not have difficulty in absorbing
those savings in productive investrnents. Mexico’s own recent experi
ence, especially since 1989, also shows that the problem in Mexico is
finding the savings to finance investment rather than stimulating
investrnent to absorb available savings. With a 1994 current account
deflcit of 7.8 percent of GDP, Mexico’s investments were 50 percent
higher than it could finance frorn domestic saving. Although changes
in taxation and in other government rules could lead to an improved
use ofthe available savings, that subject lies beyond the scope ofthis
paper.
Individuals save when they have a reason to save, when saving
is rewarded, and when the funds that are saved seem both secure and
available for unforeseen needs. Governrnent policies affect the reasons
for saving in many ways. Providing publicly financed retirement
annuities and insurance for health care and for unemployment reduce
or eliminate the reason to save forretirement and forthe uncertainties
of income and expenditure associated with unemployment and ill
health. In contrast, providing opportunities to buy quality education
at the secondary and university level and to establish new businesses
create reasons for higher levels ofpersonal saving.
Mexico has recently replaced its traditional pay-as-you-go social
security systern with a system of mandatory individual pension ac
counts that is likely to increase national saving and capital accumu
lation. The present paper focuses on other tax, regulatory and govern
ment financial policy changes that could increase the reward,
the security and the liquidity ofsavings in ways that would raise the
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national saving rate. The design of the individual pension accounts
(the AFORE program) is discussed in the Appendix to this paper.
Mexico’s macroeconomic problems during the past two decades
are a reminder of the potential importance for saving of a stable
macroeconomic environment. The possibility of very large unantici
pated increases in inflation can meanverynegative real rates ofreturn
for a large portion of the saving public. Even sophisticated investors
with substantial funds are hurt when a jurnp in inflation raises
interest rates and depresses the prices of stocks and bonds. The
tendency ofmost individuals to focus on nominal interest rates (rather
than real rates) also means that high inflation hides important differ
ences in real interest rates that would otherwise act as an incentive
to save. The Mexican government clearly recognizes the importance
of achieving and maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment.
Consideration of the rnonetary and fiscal policies that can contribute
to such greater macroeconomic stability lies outside the scope of this
paper.
1. Tax Reforms to Stimulate Saving
Mexico has a very sophisticated tax system that has continued to be
improved. There is now no tax on most investment income at the
individual level and the tax rules are designed to eliminate the dis
torting effects of inflation on the measurement of real investment
income.
Nevertheless, the system still does not fully exernpt investment
income and therefore distorts the intertemporal allocation of income
in favor of current consumption. The 32 percent tax on corporate
profits reduces the rate ofreturn available to savers. The tax equal to
1.7 percent of fixed income deposits is equivalent to a high rate oftax
on real interestwhen the real interest rates are depressed by inflation.
The real interest earned on inflation-adjusted deposits (uDIs) are still
taxed at 15 percent. Saving in the form oflife insurance gets a low net
return because the life insurance companies pay ordinary corporate
tax on the portfolio interest that they receive, reducingthe return that
they can give to insurers. The capital gains tax on unlisted corporate
securities and investment real estate distorts the allocation of busi
ness investment, reduces the overail return, and may provide an
incentive for dividend distributions that reduce total saving. The
favorable treatrnent of housing (through INFONAVIT and FOVI) also
distorts the allocation ofthe nation’s capital stock away from business
plant and equipment and toward housing. This section of the paper
discusses avariety ofoptions forreducingthesedistortions and raising
the national saving rate.
Much ofthe structure ofthe Mexican tax treatment ofinvestrnent
income is motivated by the principle of“tax neutrality”. Although tax
neutrality is in general a desirable principle (e.g., taxing corporate
dividends and corporate retained earnings equally in order not to
distort the corporate dividend decision), it may be counterproductive
to be neutral in sorne aspects ofthe tax law when there are substantial
non-neutralities in other parts. Thus if the tax systern as a whole
reduces saving, this could be balanced by tax rules that tilt the
taxation ofdividends to favor increased retained earnings and there
fore a higher saving rate. Sirnilarly, if political and historic reasons
cause government rules to favor investrnent in housing over invest
ment in business plant and equipment, the tax systern would be made
more neutral overali if the specific tax treatrnent appeared to favor
business investment in an offsetting way. These ideas will be illus
trated in more detail by specific examples.
Although the current paper focuses on policies that could encour
age private saving, the structure ofthe tax system also affects national
saving by its irnpact on total tax revenue. 1 will discuss the various
ways in which the existing structure ofmarginal tax rates and corpo
rate taxes may reduce taxable income and therefore tax revenue and
will indicate sorne possible alternatives that would raise tax revenue
without increasing tax rates.
1.1. The Tax Treatment ofLife Insurance
Life insurance is a major component of personal saving in many
countries, including the United States. Life insurance provides a
discipline on savers. Once the decision is made to purchase life insur
ance, the individual feels cornmitted to continue making premium
payments. The unchanging level of life insurance prerniurns as mdi
viduals age and the increasingdifficultyofobtaininginsuranceinlater
years (because insurability is based on recent medical history and
physical examinations) also causes individuals to want to keep their
insurance coverage. Thus, unlike much ordinary saving, saving in the
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form of life insurance is likely to be very long-term and the additions
to the insurance policies cash value are likely to be reliable.
Life insurance is also a useful way of increasing national saving
because life insurance, unlike most other forms of saving, is “sold” to
individuals. Insurance company advertising and insurance agents
who seli door-to-door create a demand for this type of saving that is
very different from the self-motivated decision to save in bank ac
counts or mutual funds.
Under the current Mexican tax law, individuals huy life insur
ance with after-tax dollars. When insurance benefits are paid, they
are not subject to tax. However, the interest received by the insurance
company on its investments is subject to tax at the regular 32 percent
corporate tax rate. Since this reduces the implicit return that insur
ance companies can offer in calculating their premiums, this tax rule
discourages the use of life insurance in comparison to other forms of
saving and therefore discourages saving overail.
In a neutral tax system, the interest income received by life
insurance companies would be taxed as it would be ifthe interest were
paid to individual savers (e.g., a tax of 1.7 percent of assets) rather
than at the 32 percent corporate tax rate. Although being neutral
in this way would not provide a net incentive to save, it would over
come the relative disadvantagethat life insurance now has and permit
it to be soid more successfully.
One approach to stimulating life insurance saving, used in the
United States, is to exempt from tax most ofthe investment income of
life insurance companies. This so-called “tax-free inside buildup”
permits the insurance companies to charge lower premiums and
provide a higher real return than would be available on other saving.
An alternative approach, used in several countries, allows mdi
viduals to deduct a portion of their life insurance premiums from
taxable income and does not tax the benefits of the insurance when
they are paid. The premium deduction method of stimulating the
demand for life insurance has the advantage ofbeing more visible to
the individual and therefore may make insurance more attractive. It
is important however to distinguish between premiums for insurance
per se (the “term” component of the life insurance) and the saving
component of the insurance so that the direct premium tax subsidy
does not increase insurance rather than saving. Moreover, since mdi
viduals with more extensive insurance may save less directly, the
effect ofthe premium subsidy might actually be to decrease national
r
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saving. The reducedtax on the interest income ofinsurance companies
would therefore be a more cost-effective way to encourage saving
through life insurance rather than the overail consumption of life
jnsurance services.
1.2. Annuities and Other Non-life Insurance Products
Life insurance is not the only type of insurance product that can
increase the national savingrate. Annuities provide insurance against
“living too long” ratherthan dying at an early age. Many life insurance
policies pay their benefits in the form of an annuity or combine life
insurance during preretirement years with an annuity (or double
life annuity) after retirement age.
Tax neutrality implies that ah such arrangements would be given
at least the same tax treatment that is now given to ordinary saving
by individuals. But saving through this route, which has the same
advantages ofpersistence and explicit selling as life insurance, could
also be encouraged explicitly.
Long-term care insurance. is a form of conditional annuity policy in
whichpaymentsare madetoanindividualwhorequireslong-termnursmg
or institutional care. Phis too involves a substantial saving component.
Property and casualty insurance also adds to the national saving
rate as insurance companies accumulate reserves and equity against
future unpaid claims. Some countries, most notably Japan, combine
property and casualty insurance with explicit tax-favored saving.
Individuals who buy these policies commit to make premium pay
ments for several years and, at the end of that time, receive a cash
sum from the insurance company independent of whether or not the
insured risk occurred. These policies effectively pass through a pretax
return to Japanese households who commit to a multiyear insurance
saving pohicy. This has been a very effective vehicle in Japan for
encouraging the marketing and purchase ofa saving product.
1.3. Cuentas Especiales de Ahorro
(Tax Favored Individual Saving Accounts)
The Cuentas Especiales de Ahorro (cEAs) permit tax deductible saving
and then tax the funds when they are withdrawn from the account.
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The analogous tax-favored saving accounts in the United States (the
Individual Retirement Accounts) and in Canada (the Registered Re
tirement Savings Plans) have been very popular and appear to have
increased national saving substantially. In contrast, CEA accounts in
Mexico are virtually unknown and little used. One reason for the lack
ofinterest in CEAS may be that government rules restricted the invest
ment options and required that a substantial portion ofthe assets be
invested in government bonds. But even with these restrictions
dropped, the CEAS may not in their current form be an effective way of
stimulating private saving.
In general, saving in the form of CEAS does not yield a higher net
of tax return than ordinary saving unless the individual expects to
have a lower marginal tax rate in the future than in the present. More
specifically, since dividends and the capital gains on stocks usted on
the Bolsa are already tax free, there is no advantage in holding such
assets in CEA5. Interest on government bonds is also untaxed, or, more
accurately, because government bond interest rates reflect this tax
free status, the yield on govemment bonds is effectively taxed at a
single rate with withholding at source. Again thereis no advantage in
holding such bonds in CEA5 since they have the same yield in CEA5 as
theydoifhelddirectly. Interest income fromnongovernmentliabilities
like bank accounts and fixed income funds is the only form ofportfolio
income that is taxed and the tax rate on such income is less than the
tax rate for other income. It is only for such taxable investments that
the CEAS provide a higher return than ordinary saving.
The rnost obvious waythat the currenttax rules could be modified
to encourage more saving in CEAS is to reduce the tax on withdrawals
offunds that are kept in CEAS for a substantial period oftime or that
are used for certain designated purposes like home purchase or edu
cation. For example, consider an individual in the 30 percent marginal
tax rate who deposits 100 pesos in a CEA and withdraws it after five
years. Exempting halfofsuch withdrawals from income tax is equiva
lent to raisingthe interest rate inthecby approximately 4 percent. 3
Although such individual tax favored saving accounts may in
creasenational savingin the longrun, duringthe earlyyears they may
Ifthe effective interest rate in the CEA is r under current law, a 100 pesos deposit grows
to 100(1 +r) 5 at the end offive years and therefore to an after-tax income for someone with a 30
percent marginal tax rate of70(1 +r) 5 . Excludinghalfofthat income from the income tax raises
the net amount to 85(1 +r) 5 . This is equivalent to raising the pretax interest rate from r to s
where 70(1 + )5
= 85(1 +r) 5 so that (1 + s) = 1.04(1 + r).
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encourage individuals with existing assets to transfer them into the
taxfavored accounts. Such individuals would imrnediatelypaylesstax
but do no additional saving. Since government saving would decline
(because of the reduced tax collection) while private saving did not
increase, national saving would decline. There are several ways that
could reduce this problem and increase the likelihood that the tax
favored accountwill cause a netincreaseinnational savingintheshort
term as well as in the longer run:
1) Shift frorn an immediate tax deduction ofthe deposited amount
to an incentive at the timethat the funds are withdrawn. Forexample,
instead of allowing a deduction for income deposited in the CEA, the
deposit could be non-deductible but receive more favorable treatment
on withdrawal. Consider again the example described aboye. The
individual in the example deposited 100 pesos in the CEA and thereby
saved 30 pesos in tax. The individual’s foregone consumption was
therefore a net 70 pesos. At the end, the funds were taxed at 15 percent
to yield net consumption of 85 (1 + r). The sarne incentive could be
achieved by allowing the individual to deposit after tax income and
then reward it when it is withdrawn by a tax credit of21 percent (i.e.,
bygivinga netwithdrawal equal to 85/70 times the deposited amount).
If the individual deposits 70 pesos of after-tax income, it grows to
70 (1 + r) 5 at the end offive years. Ifit is withdrawn at that time and
the individual receives a tax credit of 21.4 percent ofthe withdrawn
amount, the individual has 85 (1 + r) 5 to consume.
Although this does not change the present value of the govern
ment’s foregone taxes, it does postpone the government deficit. More
over, if the incentive does induce an increase in total private saving
during these five years, sorne of that saving will be invested in the
corporate sector where it generates profits that are subject to the cor
porate profits tax. The extra corporate tax payments may exceed the
individual tax credit that the government provides at the end of
the five years. If so, there is an increase in government saving as well
as in private saving. 4
2) Have a high ceiling on the amount that can be deposited to the
CEA. This is alreadytrue in Mexicowith an annual limit of46 000 pesos
On the importance of this incremental corporate tax revenue, see M. Feldstein, 1995,
pp. 475-494.
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per person. The effective limitwould be even higherifthe CEA deposits
are not tax deductible (i.e., are in after-tax pesos) as described in the
previous two paragraphs. Without a high annual limit, it is more
likely that the individual will receive a tax advantage for saving that
would already be done without facing any incentive at the margin for
a higherrate ofsaving. This is unlikely tobe a problemwith the Mexic
an lirnit.
3) Restrict the tax incentive to deposits in excess of sorne thresh
old amount. For example, the individual might be required to deposit
at least 10 percent of annual income to receive favored treatment and
the favored treatrnent might only be on amounts in excess ofthat 10
percent. Like the high limit, this type ofrule reduces the risk that an
individual will be rewarded for saving that would otherwise occur.
The maximum incentive effect from the modified CEA5 will be
obtained ifthere is no restriction on the type ofportfolio asset that can
qualify for CEA treatment, including bank deposits, mutual funds, and
separate individual brokerage accounts.
1.4. Other Tax Favored Individual Savings Accounts
The basic idea ofencouraging saving through the Cuentas Especiales
de Ahorro could be extended in a variety of ways:
1) Giving more favorable tax treatrnent to voluntary deposits in
the new mandatory individual pension accounts (AFoRE). This would
have the advantage of using an account that already exists. Funds
would have to rernain until retirement orjob loss. The tax advantage
could come in the form of a government matching contribution to the
AFRE account. Although it would technically be an increase in the budg
et deficit, it would essentially be selffinancing.
2) Encouraging employer-based voluntary additional individual
saving contributions to the AFORE accounts. In the United States, the
401k plans give employers and employees a tax deduction for funds
deposited in retirernent accounts. Participation is voluntary for the
individual but employers generally match individual contributions up
to a limit in order to increase participation. Employers are encour
aged to do this not only by the tax deductibility of such rnatching
contributions (treated as deductible wages to the employer but not
taxed to the employee) but also by the fact that senior managers can
contribute a similar share oftheir income (and therefore a much larger
dollar amount). Since 401kplans receivethis favorabletreatrnent only
ifa high fraction oflower wage employees participate, senior manage
ment has an incentive to educate, encourage and subsidize such
participation. The dollar limits on contributions were much higher
when the program began than they are today, providing a stronger
incentive for managements to establish 401k programs.
3) Permitting medical saving accounts. Health insurance policies
in the United States generally reduce the cost to the patient at the
time of care to 20 percent of the rnarket price of the service or less,
thereby greatly increasing the demand for care. Tax deductions for
health insurance premiums stimulate demand for this type ofdistor
tionary insurance. Mexico has avoided the problems created by such
incentives but rnay not be able to do so indefinitely as the existing
health care system is overhauled. An alternative option that could
reduce the pressure for favorable tax treatment of health insurance,
yet help individuals with large medical bills and contribute to national
saving is the creation of tax favored medical saving accounts. These
accounts would be like CEAS but would be used to finance medical
expenditures. If pretax pesos are contributed to the medical saving
accounts (and deductible from taxable income) and funds that are
withdrawn to finance health care are not subject to tax, individuals
would have an incentive to accumulate funds against the possibility
ofa large future medical expenditure. Although this effectively lowers
the cost of medical care by the same percentage as the individual’s
marginal tax rate, the distortion in the demand for care is much less
than it would be with insurance policies that reduce the cost ofmedical
care to the patient at the time of care by 80 percent or more. At the
cost of sorne additional administrative cornplexity, withdrawals from
the medical savings accounts could be made tax free only to the extent
that they exceeded a certain fraction of income, thereby imposing a
deductible in the implicit insurance policy and encouraging individ
uals to keep funds in the medical saving account until very large
expenses are incurred.
4) Giving special tax treatment for the existing profit sharing
bonuses if they are saved in AFORE accounts or CEAs. The 10 percent
mandatory bonuses that individuals receive are a natural target for a
saving inventive since these are irregular and lumpy payments. mdi
viduals cannot count on them to finance ordinary spending inthe same
way that they spend wages.
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1.5. The Differential Taxation ofDividends
and Retained Earnings
Current Mexican tax rules aim at neutrality between dividends and
retained earnings. Corporate profits are taxed at 32 percent. No
further tax is paid by taxpayers with ahigher tax rate. Taxpayers with
lower tax rates can gross up the dividend that they receive, include
the grossed up dividend in taxable income, but receive a credit for the
tax paid by the firm. For the majority of shareholders who face
marginal tax rates of 37.5 percent, this method is neutral between
retained earnings and dividends. For shareholders with lower mar
ginaltaxrates, it provides an incentive forcompanies to pay dividends
since retained earnings are taxed at the higher rate until the funds
are distributed, i.e., the company provides an interest free loan to the
govemment ofthe additionaltaxthat will laterbe given backinthe form
of a credit to lower marginal tax rate shareholders.
Evidence from other countries suggeststhat private savingwould
probably be increased by taxing retained earnings at a lowerrate than
dividends. Thatexperience shows that differential taxation increases
retained earnings; this is likely to be particularly true in Mexico since
the capital gains that result from increased retained earnings are not
subject to tax for either usted or unlisted companies. Statistical stud
ies ofother countries also show that a shift from dividends to retained
earnings reduces current consumption.
A differential taxation ofdividends and retained earnings can be
done in a revenue neutral way by reducing the tax on retained
earnings and increasingthe tax on dividends. Suchrevenue neutrality
on this type of income is obviously not necessary for overall revenue
neutrality. The discussion ofthe corporate tax in section 1.7 suggests
that a revenue neutral reduction ofthe totalburden on the corporation
is another way to increase total saving.
The current method of treating the corporate tax payment as a
withholding ofthe individual tax on corporate profits, to be recognized
at the individual taxpayer level by a gross up and credit calculation,
is not currently extended to the Cuentas Especiales de Ahorro. Doing
so would mean crediting the corporate tax to the individual CEAS,
providing a substantial additional incentive to save. A similar corpo
ratetaxrebate could be given fordividends receivedin AFORE accounts.
1.6. Capital Gains Taxation
The current method ofnot taxing capital gains on stocks usted on the
Bolsa while taxing capital gains on shares in unlisted companies and
in real estate creates an anomalous distortion between the two classes
of assets. It is likely to distort investment in favor of exchange usted
companies and to encourage unlisted companies to distribute more of
their earnings than they otherwise would. To the extent that such
distributions rise, total saving is likely to be depressed.
The current method ofadjusting the basis ofthe capital gains tax
for unlisted companies (adding retained earnings and adjusting the
resulting basis for the increase in the general price level) is only a
partial remedy. A general increase in the price to book ratio of all
companies would cause a taxable capital gain on the sale ofan unlist
ed company but no tax liability on the sale of a usted company. The
avoidance ofsuch taxes mayhavekept investors locked into the shares
oftheir unlisted companies, reducing market efficiency.
A further difference between listed and unlisted companies is in
the treatment of capital losses. An individual who invests in an
unlisted company can offset a capital loss only against capital gains
for other unlisted companies. If sorne investors in unlisted companies
have net capital gains while others have equally large net capital losses,
there will be a net capital gain tax liability even though there is no
aggregate capital gain. This biases investments away from unlisted
companies and, more generally, reduces the rate ofreturn on saving.
Since the avowed purpose of the capital gains tax on unlisted
companies is not to raise revenue and since the capital gains tax
currently raises relatively little revenue, there would be a correspond
ingly small direct revenue loss in the shift to a more neutral capital
gains tax rule.
1.7. PensionFunds
Voluntary corporate pension funds are a major source ofsaving in most
countries but are hardly used at all in Mexico. One reason for this is
probably the restriction that 30 percent oftax deductible pension funds
must be invested in govemment bonds. Eliminating this restriction, in
parallel to eliminating the restriction on the investments in Cuentas de
Ahorro, might make pension investing substantially more attractive.
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Allowing pension funds to use the gross-up-and-credit method to
obtain the corporate tax paid on the dividends they receive would be
a further incentive for the expansion ofcorporate pension plans.
The German method ofbook reservingpensions might also stimu
late the introduction ofpensions by companies that have limited capi
tal and a high cost ofexternal funds. In contrast to the current system
in Mexico and in the United States, which grant a tax deduction only
for employer contributions to a separate pension fund that must be
invested almost completely in securities issued by other companies,
Germany gives a tax deduction to a company that grants a pension
benefit to its employees if it reserves for that obligation on its books.
In effect, this permits the company to invest its pension contribution
in its own company instead of in other firms and still get the tax
advantage.
1.8. The Corporate Tax Rate
The 32 percent corporate tax rate is an anomaly in a tax system that
exciudes most other types of capital income or taxes that income at
lower rates than other income. The corporate profits tax discriminates
against equity in favor of debt and against corporate investments in
favor of other activities like housing and foreign investment. More
generally, it reduces the return on capital and therefore the incentive to
save. Reducing the corporate tax rate and substituting a higher rate
ofvalue added tax, payroli tax or personal income tax would increase
the incntive to save.
Th higher tax on corporate profits also shifts capital and eco
nomic activity from the formal sector where profits and labor incomes
are taxed to the informal sector where no taxes are paid. To the extent
that the high rate ofcorporate tax shifts activity to the informal sector,
the government may lose more revenue from the reduced tax base
(including lowerpersonal income tax and payroiltax collections as well
as reduced profits tax and value added tax revenue) than it gains from
5 Although this is effectively an unfunded pension system, it differs in a fundamental way
fi-orn an unfwided public systern. The company’s unfunded obligation to pay future pension
benefits reduces the market value ofthe company and therefore the weath ofits sharehoMers.
Statistical studies of US corporations show that the market value of a cornpany is reduced
essentially dollar for dollar by such unfunded liabilities. The lower market value of the shares
reduces consumption ofshareholders and therefore increases saving.
the higher tax rate. A lower corporate tax rate might therefore raise
total tax revenue and therefore national saving. Although this would
be a veryunusual conclusion in manycountries, theverylarge untaxed
informal sector in Mexico makes this a significant possibility that
deserves careful analysis.
The high current rates of personal income tax, payroll tax and value
added tax may also drive economic activity from the formal sector into
the informal sector. The combination ofa 35 percent marginal rate of
personal income tax (reached at a relatively low level of income) and
a substantial payroll tax implies a high combined effective tax rate on
wages earned in the formal sector that are not paid on wage income
in the informal sector. The 15 percent value added tax reduces the
demand for the products of the formal sector relative to the informal
sector.
This situation, like the effect of the corporate tax described in
section 1.7, implies that reducing the tax rate may actually increase
tax revenue by drawing employment and therefore taxable income
from the informal sector to the formal sector. The traditional labor
supply elasticities are less relevant here than the extent to which
workers shift between the taxed and untaxed sectors in response to
differences in the tax rate.
There are three possible types ofpolicy actions that could reduce
this distortion, thereby increasing tax revenue and national saving:
1) Reducing the effective marginal rate ofpayroil tax by relating
incremental benefits to incremental taxes. The AFORE reforms convert
a substantial portion ofthe previous payroll tax into benefits that are
proportional to the amount of AFORE contribution paid. If this is fully
communicated to employees, what appears to typical employees in the
old system as a tax would now be seen as a way ofcreating personal
wealth. Al! of this would change if individuals understood the per
sonal wealth character of the retirement AFORE accounts, if those
accounts pay a high rate ofreturn, ifthe death and disability benefits
are related to the individual’s contribution, and if the Housing AFORE
provides a rate ofreturn comparable to the return on the retirement
AFORE.
1.9. Income and Payroil Taxes
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2) Changing the nature of the health insurance financing to
reduce the marginal tax rate beyond the reductions enacted at the end
of 1998. There is still a major payroil tax devoted to financing health
care. Although the individual who pays this tax (either directly or
through foregone wages) is entitied to sorne health services that are
not available to those who work only in the informal sector, the tax is
proportional to wages aboye a floor while the benefits are unrelated to
the amount of tax that is paid. These health care costs could be
financed by a different combination oftaxes, employer contributions,
and personal charges. A greaterreliance on the value added tax would
reduce the discrimination against employment in the formal sector.
Over time, the financing of health care might be directed to greater
individual responsibility (through copayments financed out ofpocket
or from a medical saving account) or to an employer based premium
system that is not proportional to wages.
3) Shifting the mixture oftaxes from payroli and income taxes to
the value added tax. The payroil and income taxes are collected only
from those who work in the formal sector. The value added tax is borne
by anyone who buys productsthat embodythevalue added tax. A shift
to a value added tax would therefore shift sorne of the burden from
individuals employed in the formal sector to those in the informal
sector. Greater reliance on the VAT would therefore raise total tax
revenue without increasing taxes on those who currently pay income
and payroll taxes. Reducing the advantage ofworking in the informal
sector would also shift employment and income from the informal sec
tor to the formal sector, thereby raising the income and payroll taxes. 6
The Mexican financial system provides a wide range of financial
products and institutions. Legal reforms in recent years and the
introduction ofinflation-adjusted UDI accounts have created improved
opportunities for saving. Commercial banks provide large nationwide
branch networks and actively promote saving by a variety ofproducts
including saving accounts with relatively small minimum balances,
electronic payroll deposits, debit cards, inflation-adjusted accounts
6 The traditional pro-saving case for a value added tax (that a VAT exempts saving) is less
relevantin Mexico since the Mexican tax system already exempts most ofthe income fromsaving.
and a range of mutual funds. This section describes sorne further
reforms that could stirnulate additional saving by increasing the
reward for saving and the liquidity ofsaving deposits.
2.1. Enhancing the Liquidity ofLong-term Saving
Most financial deposits and fixed-income assets have very shortdura
tions. Although individuals can obviously do long-term saving using
these short-term assets, the absence of longer term assets makes it
impossible to obtain fixed long-term real returns. Individuals might
be willing to save more ifthey could invest those savings in long-term
assets that provide an attractive real return and that are protected
from the risks of unpredictable inflation. Today the longest such
inflation-adjusted assets are three year UDI deposits that pay real
yields ofvarying size, depending on the size ofthe deposit. Most time
deposits are actually much shorter than this, with one month and
three month deposits the most common form oftime deposit.
The absence oflonger term ur» time deposits and the preference
for very short deposits do not appear to reflect an unwillingness of
banks to supply longer term assets withrelatively attractive realrates
ofreturn. Instead, their absence in the market seems to be due to an
unwillingness ofindividuals to commit funds for longerperiods oftime
despite the ur» inflation adjustrnent and the existence ofgovernment
guarantees of bank deposits. Individuals apparently value liquidity
and are unwilling to place funds beyond reach for long periods oftime
in order to get a predictable rate ofreturn.
Although banks could in principle offer a product that combines
a long-term guaranteed real rate with the option ofearly withdrawal
at a penalty (as banks do in the United States), they are currently
prevented from doing so by financial regulations. Government regula
tions could be modified to permit such products to be issued.
Any rules that currently prevent the creation of tradable long
term ur» bank certificates of deposit (backed by ur» denominated
mortgages, long-term corporate UDI loans or government uDI bonds)
and corporate uru denominated bonds could also be eliminated. Doing
so would permit individuals to have a guaranteed realfixedrate ifthey
hoid the asset to maturity while retaining the liquidity ofbeing able
to seli the certificate ofdeposit or bond iffunds are needed before then.
2. Reform ofFinancial Regulation
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2.2. Reducing Asset Restrictions
The government’s decision to remove the requirement that 30 percent
of the funds in Cuentas Especiales de Ahorro (cEAs) be invested in
government bonds will increase the attractiveness ofthose accounts. 7
Other restrictions on the assets in these accounts could also be re
moved, particularly the restriction precluding investments in equity
mutual funds.
Similar restrictions on other types of accounts could also be
eliminated, including the rule requiring company pensions to invest
in government bonds.
Banks are currently perrnitted to offer dollar and other foreign
exchange accounts onlyto business custorners. Sorne individuals may
feel that deposits denominated in dollars or other foreign currencies
would be more secure or would provide a useful hedge as part of an
overali portfolio. Banks could be permitted to create such deposits,
subject to appropriate capital requirernents ifthose foreign exchange
liabilities are not hedged in the futures market.
2.3. Avoiding Excess Credit
Recent experience suggests that banks may have a tendency to take
considerable risks by giving large amounts of credit to consurners in
the form of credit card balances and mortgages. Risky lending prac
tices do not raise the bank’s cost of deposit funds because depositors
know that the government guarantees the nominal value of their
deposits. Borrowers may even borrow with the belief that they will
be able to restructure their debts if macroeconomic conditions or
personal circumstances make loan repayment particularly burden
sorne.
Although the internationally agreed risk based capital standards
for banks (the Basel standards) relate each bank’s capital requirement
to the composition ofits assets, the classification does not distinguish
between a high risk credit card or other consumer loan and a business
loan to a corporation with a strongcredit rating. Mortgage loans actually
require less capital than high grade corporate loans.
The Mexican government could introduce higher capital require
ments on consumer loans and home mortgages than are called for by
the Basel agreement. Higher capital standards would cause banks to
raise the cost of such loans, restricting their overail use. Capital
standards for mortgages might be related directly to each bank’s
average loan to value ratio, thereby inducing banks to raise the cost
ofmortgages with high loan to value ratios. That in turn would induce
mortgage borrowers to save more before obtaining a mortgage and to
pay down mortgage debt more quickly. These changes would not only
increase the stability ofthe banking system but would also reduce the
amount ofconsumer borrowing and would thereby raise net saving. 8
2.4. Encouraging Small Savers
Although commercial banks are already reaching out to small savers
in a variety of ways, the mínimum deposits required to open certain
types of accounts may deter lower income individuals from beginning
a program of saving. Time deposits with reasonably attractive rates
ofreturn may require a minimurn deposit of 2 000 pesos and mutual
fund accounts that pay market rates ofreturn may require balances
as high as 300 000 pesos. Banks set these minimurn deposit amounts
to balance their desire to attract deposits and their cost of servicing
small accounts. But ifthere is a public policy goal to increase saving,
it may be worthwhile to require banks to offer these products with
smaller minimum deposits. Banks in turn could reduce the cost of
servicing these accounts by higher charges for withdrawals and other
specific services.
2.5. Encouraging Larger Home Mortgage Downpayments
Mexico could raise the national saving rate by encouraging larger
downpayments bymortgage borrowers. An interesting example ofhow
this can be done is the practice in Gerrnany where the accumulation
ofdownpayment balances for home mortgages is an important compo
See section 1.3 for other changes that could enhance the attractiveness of the cuentas
Especiales de Ahorro.
8 Between 1988 and 1994, the outstanding volume of consumer and mortgage loans rose
from 2 percent of GDP to 12 percent of GDP, an increase that reduced net saving per year by about
two percent of GDP
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nent ofhousehold saving. German savings banks offer individuals the
opportunity to write a contract that specifies the amount of a future
house purchase and the fraction of that purchase price that the
individual will accumulate as a downpayment. Downpayments must
be 50 percent or 60 percent ofthe purchase price. The individual agrees
to receive a low rate ofinterest on the balance in the housing account
while the downpayment is being accumulated. Afterthe downpayment
is accumulated, the individual can obtain a mortgage for the rest of
the amount at a low interest rate. This has the advantage ofproviding
a commitment to accumulate and a reward for reaching the prespeci
fied goal, with a greater net reward the more quickly the goal is
reached. It would be desirable to see if any banking regulations in
Mexico preclude or hinder experiments with this type ofcontract.
3. Government Debt Management
Although domestic government debt is now officially only about 20
percent of GDP, the government can manage its debt in ways that
contribute to higher personal saving by providing assets that make
saving more attractive. The government can also initiate securities
that private issuers can copy after the financial markets and house
hold savers become comfortable with them. If increasing national
saving is an explicit goal of national policy, the government’s debt
management should consider that goal and notjust seek to minimize
the cost of servicing the debt.
3.1. Taxable and Nontaxable Long-term Indexed (uDI) Debt
One example of a new pro-saving instrument would be a range of
longer term bonds that are indexed to the general price level, i.e., that
are denominated in UDIS. These could in principle include maturities
of up to 20 years. The relative volume of longer maturities might
increase over time as the market for such securities develops; in the
United States about 15 percent ofthe government debthas a maturity
of 10 years or more.
Since such securities do not currently exist in Mexico, the likely
shape ofthe yield curve is uncertain. Themarketmightpayapremium
for the certainty of an inflation-indexed long term saving vehicle.
Alternatively, there could be a “normal” upward sloping yield curve so
that the government might have to accept a higher total cost of debt
service than it could achieve with shorter maturity debt. But even if
the yield is 200 basis points higher on a quarter of the government
debt, the resulting increase in government outlays would be less than
one-tenth of one percent of GDP. This could be more than offset if the
availability of these government securities leads to increased saving
and therefore to increased corporate tax revenue.
The current method of issuing government bonds that are not
subject to tax is effectively equivalent to imposing a withholding tax
on government interest payments. Market yields on government pa
per are lowerthan they would be ifthe yield were taxable. Issuing only
tax exempt bonds has three disadvantages:
1) Lower income savers are charged the same implicit rate oftax
as higher income individuals. A taxable bond which carried a higher
interest rate might provide almost the same net yield to taxpayers
with a 35 percent marginal rate as they receive today but would
provide a substantially higher net yield and greater saving incentive
to individuals with lower marginal tax rates.
2) Tax free bonds are not a desirable investment for tax-free
accounts like AFORES, CEAS and corporate pensions. The current method
works against the basic purpose ofcreating tax free accounts: permit
ting individuals to receive ordinary pretax market yields free of tax.
Taxable corporate debt would dominate comparable government secu
rities if the government securities have a tax-free yield. If the only
long-term indexed debt is issued by the government its attractiveness
for tax favored saving accounts would be diminished by the lower
tax-free yield.
3) Issuingtaxable governmentbonds would permit foreignbuyers
of Mexican government debt to receive a higher yield than they do
today at no greater cost to the government of Mexico. Although the
interest on Mexican government bonds is not taxable to Mexicans, it
is taxable to American individuals. Ifthe Mexican government issued
a taxable bond with a higher interest rate and withheld tax explicitly,
the cost to the government ofMexico would be the same as it is with the
current lower yielding tax free bonds but the American investor could
claim a tax credit for the tax paid in Mexico and therefore receive a
higher net oftax yield. Tbis would increase the foreign demand for Mex
ican debt and permit a lower overali cost ofservicing the Mexican debt.
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The British government has used moderate denomination “lottery
bonds” to increase the demand for its public debt among small savers.
Alotterybond is like an ordinary bond exceptthat bond serialnumbers
are drawn randomly each week and those individuals whose bonds
match the selected numbers win substantial money prizes. Lottery
bonds carry a lower interest rate than similar maturity and denomi
nation ordinary government debt. In addition to lowering the cost of
debt service, such bonds may induce additional saving by individuals
who are attracted by the potential for a large gain.
Although a postal saving system might seem like a natural way to
accurnulate savings from low income households, the Mexican postal
saving system (PAHNAL) has failed to tap this market. Despite sorne
240 offices and 45 years ofexperience, the system now has only 200 000
accounts. That is less than one percent of Mexican households and a
remarkably inefficient low ratio ofless than 1 000 accounts per office.
Any government resource cost used to operate this system could
probably be better deployed in raising saving in other ways. 9
Although economists generallyview saving decisions in purely self-in
terest terms, sorne individuals might be motivated to save if they
believed that their saving would directly help to accomplish sorne
public purpose thatthey favor. Such sentiments motivate a wide range
of charitable contributions and were used by the US government to
motivate saving and the purchase ofgovernrnent “war bonds” during
World War II.
The Mexican government might consider issuing special bonds
that finance environmental projects, or the building of schools and
hospitals, or infrastructure in particular regions. Although govern
The PA}INAL has recently been reformed so there remains a possibility that it will now
be more successful than it was before the reforms.
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ment funds obtained by borrowing are fungible, individuals may like
to think of their savings as going to activities that they particularly
favor.
4. Public Education Campaigns
and Government Advocacy
Saving and long-term accurnulation are socially conditioned forms of
behavior. Individuals learn to save by watching the behavior oftheir
family and their friends. Government programs to educate people about
the need to save and about the benefit from saving can change attitudes
and raise national saving rates.
Many ofthe high savingcountries have made ahighrate ofsaving
a primary national goal. Education campaigns and simple but wide
spread advertising have reinforced the advantages of favorable tax
rules and financial regulations. Irnportant government departrnents
have been given responsibility for developing policies, programs and
advertising to raise saving.’°
Most individuals do not understand the existing saving opportu
nities in Mexico, especially the UDI denominated assets, Cuentas
Especiales de Ahorro, AFORE accounts, and mutual funds. It is difficult
for thern to see through the high and volatile nominal interest rates
to understand the underlying real rates and to appreciatethesubstan
tial cumulative effect of a personal prograrn of long-terrn accurnula
tion.
There are too many individual financial institutions for any one
ofthem to benefit sufficiently from undertaking a general advertising
carnpaign airned at raisingthe personal saving rate. This is an activity
that the government rnight do or may carry out in conjunction with
private institutions that are more accustomed to advertising and
marketing activities.
Martin Feldstein
3.3. The Postal Saving System (PAHNAL)
1
3.4. Special Purpose Gouernment Bonds
10 1n Japan, the Savings Promotion Department ofthe Bank ofJapan was created in 1946
and the Saving Pronotion Center ofthe Ministry ofFinance was established in 1957. Germany
used large scale public campaigns during the 1950s to stimulate saving.
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Appendix
Reform ofthe Retirement Saving Account System”
The reform ofthe system ofRetirement Saving Accounts (Sistema de
Ahorro para el Retiro or AFORE) is the most important policy initiative
for raising the Mexican saving rate in the long—term. An unfunded
pay-as-you-go program like the previous Mexican social security retire
ment system administered by the IMSS (Le., the Mexican National Social
Security Administration ) reduces national saving by discouraging pri
vate savingwithout doinganypublic saving. Incontrast,the substitution
of a funded program for an unfunded program can eventually raise
national saving by nearly the fuli amount ofthe mandatory saving.
The short-run effect on savings ofthe shift from the IMSS pay-as
you-go system to a funded program (in addition to the previously
existing 2 percent ofpayroll AFORE contribution) depends on how the
benefits of current retirees and of those who will retire in the near
future are financed. If the government raises taxes or reduces other
government spending in order to finance these existing benefit obliga
tions (as Chile did when it made a similar transition), national saving
can rise by nearly the fuil amount of the mandatory AFORE contribu
tions. If, however, the government borrows to finance the exist
ing benefit obligations, the government borrowing in the short-run
may absorb all ofthe mandatory AFORE contributions, leaving no net
short-run increase in national saving.
Even if the existing benefit obligations are financed by govern
ment borrowing, the shift to a funded social security retirement
system will substantially raise the long-run saving rate. Over time,
the aggregate annual AFORE contributions will grow with the size ofthe
laborforce and the average level ofwages whilethe benefits to existing
retirees will decline as those who earned benefit rights under the
previous unfunded system die. In the end, the shift from an unfunded
system to a fully funded AFORE program with equal annual contribu
tions adds nearly the fuil amount ofthe AFORE saving to the national
saving rate.’ 2
11 A version ofthis appendix was written in the 1995 paper before the legislative decisions
about the existing program. The appendix is included because ah programs evolve over
time and because the issues discussed here may be ofinterest to social security reformers and
designers in other countries.
12 say “nearly” because the higher yield on k’Oas contributions than on the unfunded
social security taxes has an income effect” that increases consumption.
In addition to the mandatory AFORE savings, the AFORE system
may increase saving by permitting more individuals to plan an earlier
retirement than they otherwise would have. The planned increase
in retirement years will induce individuals to want to accumulate
more savings per year while they are working because they have a
shorter working life and a longer retirement period.
This Appendix now discusses several important practical issues
about the AFORE reform that can affect how much the shift contributes
to national saving in both the short-run and the longer term.
A.1. Public Understanding ofthe AFORE Program
The previous system of AFORE accounts that channeled 2 percent of
each employee’s wages from the employer to the government via the
Bank of Mexico left little public understanding of the proposed role
of AFORE accounts in the future. Because of past administrative
problems, individuals generally did not know the balance intheir own
accounts and each individual typically had more than one account.
Employers and employees could easily regard the AFORE as just an
other tax.
Achieving the fuil benefit ofthe new AFORE system requires that
the public be educated about the nature and value oftheir accounts,
about their investment options, and about the contribution that their
savings make to national capital accumulation and growth. A firm
understanding that the funded accounts offer a substantially higher
real rate ofreturnthan the implicit return ofan unfunded pay-as-you
go system can counter political pressure to slip back to an unfunded
system, a retreat that could create a windfall gain to existing retirees
and older workers but that would hurt younger employees as well as
long-term saving and growth.
A widespread understanding of the high return available on
AFORE accounts and of the direct link between individuals’ AFORE
contributions and their subsequent retirement incomes would also
have the advantage of eliminating (or at least attenuating) the per
ception that the mandatory contribution is “just another tax”. If
individuals recognize their personal gain from additional AFORE con
tributions, the mandatory contributions will not discourage work
effort and encourage movement to the informal sector in the way that
payroll and income taxes do.
1
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The government and private financial institutions could usefully
undertake a public education carnpaign designed to prornote an un
derstanding ofthe AFORE accounts among the general working public.
More generally, ah aspects of the design and administration of the
AFORE program are not only irnportant in themselves but also because
oftheir impact on the public’s perception ofthe AFORE system.
A.2. The Magnitude ofthe AFORE Contributions
Early discussions of the AFORE reform assumed that after the transi
tion from the current system, the AFORE retirement benefits would be
funded by a combination of the current 2 percent AFORE contribution
and the portion ofthe ¡MSS payroil tax currently designated for retire
ment (3 percent). It is not clear that this shift ofthe existing ¡MSS tax
plusthe currentmandatory AFORE contributionwill be sufficientto fund
a level ofretirement benefits that policy officials regard as desirable.
Sorne simplified calculations suggest that a higher level of contribu
tion would be necessary to provide a benefit equal to 50 percent or
more ofthe individual’s preretirernent wage.
Consider an individual who works and contributes 5 percent ofbis
wage (the existing 2 percent mandatory AFORE contribution plus the 3
percentthat now goes to the IMSS forretirement) to an AFORE for 40years.
Ifhis real wage increases at a 3 percent per year and the funds in the
AFORE account earn a real return of 6 percent,13 the funds accumulated
at the end of40 years will equal 3.7 times his final year’s wage. With a
real return of 6 percent, each 100 pesos of accumulated assets can
generate an annual retirement benefit of 8.7 pesos for 20 years. The
accumulatedfund of3.7 times the finalyear’s wage cantherefore provide
a 20 year annuity equal to 32 percent ofthe final year’s wage. To pro-
vide an annual benefit equal to 50 percent ofan individual’s final wage
would require an AFORE contribution ofnearly 8 percent with these sarne
assumptions (a 6 percent real yield; a 3 percent annual rate of wage
growth; a 40 year working life; and a 20 year retirernent).
A lower real rate ofreturn, a shorter working life or a faster rate
of wage growth would require an even higher rate of AFORE contribu
tion to achieve the same ratio ofbenefits to final year’s earnings. For
13 A 6 percent real return is a reasonable assumption if AFORE funds can be invested in a
cornbination ofequity and debt.
example, ifthe AFORE rate ofreturn were himited to 4 percent real rate
and the individual’s wages grew at 4 percent, it would require a 17
percent AFORE contribution rate to achieve a retirement benefit equal
to 50 percent ofthe individual’s final year wage.
The rate ofcontribution required to achieve any desired replace
ment rate depends on the hikely rate of wage increase, the expected
mortahity table and the rate of return that the AFORE can earn. The
rate ofreturn to be assumed will ofcourse depend onthetypes ofassets
in which the AFORE funds are invested. To avoid an impossibly high
AFORE contribution rate, funds must be invested in a way that can be
expected to earn a relativelyhigh rate ofreturn. 1 return tothis subject
in section A.5.
A.3. Death and Disability Coverage
The social security institute (IMss) currently collects payroil taxes of3
percent ofcovered wages fordeath and disabilityinsurance in addition
to the 3 percent that it collects for retirement benefits. Shifting the
death and disability insurance from the current pay-as-you-go ¡MSS
program to individual funded accounts could increase the saving rate
in the same general way as shifting to funded retirement accounts.
The traditionah “whole life” type oflife insurance policy accurnu
lates a fund to pay future death benefits in rnuch the same way that
a retirement fund accumulates assets to finance benefits during re
tirernent years. A group of “whohe life” policies will have relatively
little payout to individuals before retirement age and will therefore
accumulate a substantial fund. In contrast, pure term insurance
provides death benefits with no capital accurnulation. Term insur
ance premiums are much lower for younger workers and rise with age.
Avariety ofinterrnediate forms exist, typically utilizing an accumula
tion of funds to slow the age-related rise in premiums.
The key point is that these are actuarially equivalent approaches
that will have the same effect on national saving if the difference
between the whole life premium and the lower prernium on other
pohicies is explicitly saved as an addition to the AFORE Retirement
Account. There are however administrative differencesthatmay affect
the preferred form ofinsurance. It might be possible, for example, to
reduce anyselfselection problems byrequiringemployers to buy group
term insurance for all employees (instead ofmaking payments to the
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IMSS), adding the balance of the life insurance funds to the regular
AFORE retirement account ofthe individual’s choice.
Similarly, the disability insurance could be a term policy or could
involve accumulation to maintain a level annual premium. An em
ployer based term policy would be one way of avoiding the selection
problems associated with individual demand for disability insurance.
Again the excess funds could be added to the regular AFORE retirement
account.
Shiftingthe current social security death and disabilityprograrns
from the IMSS to private carriers is likely to provide greater cost and
service efficiencies as a result of competition as wefl as a more
innovative process that offers new insurance options. Private insurers
are also likely to do a better job than a public agency like IMSS of
monitoringand controllingthe moralhazard problems that are always
present in disability insurance programs.
A.4. The Transition Process
Acriticalaspect ofthe AFOREreforrn is thetreatment ofcurrentretirees
and ofemployees who have been contributing to the existingunfunded
IMSS retirement program. There are two separate issues: the benefits
that these individuals receive and the way that those benefits are
financed. How these issues are resolved will affect the national saving
rate for many years and may also affect the political viability of the
funded AFORE approach.
Existing retirees could continue to receive their current real
benefits from the IMSS as long as they are alive or they could receive
compensation related to the present actuarial value ofthose benefits
instead of a future benefit stream. That compensation could be in the
form ofnegotiable “recognition bonds” (as in Chile) or could be depos
ited to the individual’s AFORE account. Similarly, existing workers
could receive future IMSS benefits based on their work experience to
date (in addition to the AFORE benefits that they will accumulate in
future years) or they could be compensated with an appropriate
addition to their AFORES.
A recognition bond or AFORE deposit would be a substantial
administrative simplification since it would eliminate the need for
continuing the ¡MSS buréaucracy that would otherwise make retire
ment benefit payments. This is particularly true for current pre-re
tirement empioyees forwhom benefits would be ablended combination
ofthe AFORE retirement benefits and the IMSS benefits. Moreover, any
systern that continues the IMSS retirement benefits runs a greater risk
of political pressure at sorne future date to return to an unfunded
system with a lower national saving rate.
The financing ofthe transition benefits is a separate problern. If
the transition is done byprovidingcompensating deposits to the AFORE
accounts (or recognition bonds), the funds needed to provide that
compensation can be obtained by a combination of higher taxes and
lower government spending in sorne other part of the budget or they
can be borrowed.’ If the cornpensation is financed with additional
current taxes and cuts in current spending, all future AFORE contribu
tions will be available to finance additions to thenational capital stock.
If, however, the cornpensating deposits are financed by issuing new
governrnent bonds, the government will need to raise future taxes or
to borrow a portion offuture AFORE savings to pay the interest on those
governrnent bonds. If future taxes are not raised, the borrowing to
financetheseinterestpayrnents will at first absorb all ofthe new AFORE
contributions. Over time, however, the AFORE contributions will grow
while the interest payments remain constant, permitting a net contri
bution to national saving.
The effect is similar in principie ifthe transition involves contin
ued ¡MSS payments (instead of explicit issuance of new government
debt to finance compensatory contributions to the AFORE accounts). 15
If the governrnent does not increase taxes or cut other spending, the
AFORE contributions (that are diverted from ¡MSS taxes) will initially
all have to be borrowed by the governrnent to finance the ongoing IMSS
payments. Over time, however, the IMSS payments will eventually
decline while the AFORE contributions will grow.
Thus, in the long run the shift to the AFORE method will increase
national saving and capital formation but, in the near term, the effect
on saving ofthe shift to a funded system will depend on how existing
retirees and employees are treated. An end to the IMSS benefits with
compensation financed by increasing sorne other tax or reducing sorne
other form ofgovernment spendingwould be rnost favorableto saving.
14 Only because of the relatively small size ofthe compensation now required in Mexico it is possible to contemplate financing this over a few years by tax increases or spending cuts. 15 Aithough the two approaches are formally equivalent, using explicit recognition bonds instead ofcontinued IMSS payments reduces the risks ofdiverting fiinds froxnretirement tohealth and ofreturning to a pay-as-yougo system.
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Moreover, the very young age of the Mexican population and the
extensive “informal” sector of the economy where individuals do not
participate in the existing social security program, imply that such a
tax-and-spending-cut approach to financing the transition payments
would be relatively small, currently less than one percent of GDP per
year for the retirement program and just about one percent when
death and disability benefits are included as well.16 Any delay in
making such a shift will only make it more costly as the population
ages and the size ofthe formal sector grows. But even a debt financed
payment of compensation or continuation of the implicit debt in the
form of ¡MSS obligations to pay future benefits would mean a gradual
and permanent increase in national saving over an extended period of
years ‘7
A.5. AFORE Investment Policy
The increased private capital stock that results from AFORE savings is
likelyto earn a real pretaxrate ofreturn ofat least 10 percent. Because
the returns earned in AFORE accounts are not taxed,’ 8 the individual
investors would be able to obtain most of this pretax return. Even
allowing for a 34 percent corporate tax on the profits accruing to
corporate equity, the real netrate ofreturn available to AFORE accounts
that invest in a mix of debt and equity similar to the corporate
financing ratios should exceed 7 percent.
The calculations reported in section A.2 show that a relatively
high yield on AFO1 accounts is needed to permit the combination of
an acceptable replacement rate atretirement and an acceptable AFORE
contribution rate during working years. Although it is important to
avoid excessive risk in the AFORE investments, a broadly diversified
mixture ofdebt and equity could provide an appropriate combination
ofgood yield and acceptable risk. Since the investments are very long
term, theyear toyearvolatility should not be a primary consideration.
16 J 1994, the ¡MSS paid 9.2 billion pesos in pension benefits and an additional 4.6 billion
pesos in death and disability benefita. GDP in 1994 was 1 253 billion pesos.
17 For an explicit analysis ofthis type oftransition, see the appendix to my introductory
chapter in M. Feldstein, 1998.
18 Withdrawals are currently taxed only if they exceed fine minimuin wages. However,
since employers contributions are deductible (like wages) but are not taxed to the individual, the
effective rate ofreturn when withdrawals are tazad is equivalent te a tax-free return on savings
out ofafter-tax wages.
The typical US corporate pension fund investment of60 percent equity
and 40 percent debt is a useful benchmark.’ 9
The government might encourage investing in such a diversified
debt-equity portfolio by providing a guarantee that the value of each
AFORE account would not be less than would have occurred with a two
percent real return on contributions. Although short run market
volatility might make this guarantee operative in the early years of
an AFORE account, over time the value of the AFORE account would
almost certainly become so much larger than the guaranteed amount
that the guarantee would become irrelevant.
AFORE investments in Mexican equities would gradually help to
deepen the capital market, encourage the listing ofstocks, and reduce
the cost of equity funds. The effect on these financial markets in the
short run would not, however, be very large and would certainly not
destabilize the equity market. Even an AFORE contribution of7 percent
of wages would only add about one percent of GDP a year to AFORE
accounts.
Overtime, the AFORE investmentfunds could offer a broaderarray
ofoptions that increase yield or reduce risk. For example, diversifica
tion into US and other foreign securities, hedged into pesos, can
probably reduce risk without lowering expected return. Moreover,
such diversification would not alter the funds available for domestic
investment since the hedging would be effectively equivalent to bor
rowing abroad those funds that are invested in foreign securities.
The nature ofthe investments that are allowed in AFORE accounts
is important for promoting public understanding ofthe nature ofthe
AFORE program. Continuing the practice of require (or even ofjust
offering) depositswith the Bank ofMexicothat provide a low real yield
convey the wrong impression that AFORE contributions are stilljust a
tax taken by the government to finance government deficits. The real
yield on inflation indexed accounts (uDI accounts) exceeds the return
currently paid by the Bank of Mexico on AFORE accounts.
Similarly, restricting AFORE accounts to investing wholly orpartly
in government bonds would also create the impression that the man
datory AFORE contributions are just a disguised form of taxation and
that nothing has really changed from the original pay-as-you-go re
tirement system.
‘ 9 On the risk aspects ofan investment based system like the AFORE, seeM. Feldstein and
E. Ranguelova, 1998.
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The fact that the government has to borrow during the transition
(unless taxes are raised or other spending reduced) to finance retire
ment benefit obligations to existing retirees and to employees with
past IMSS contributions is not a reason for the government to require
that government bonds be purchased by the AFORE accounts. AFORE
purchases ofcorporate debt and equity would release funds that could
then be used to purchase the government bonds. In a debt financed
transition, these purchases are at firstjust an offset for government
borrowing but over time the private equity and debt purchases by
AFORE accounts directly finance a net addition to the capital stock.
The proposed administrative system requires employers to select an
account administratorto whom the AFORE contributions are paid. Each
individual employee can then teil the account administrator the name
ofthe fund manager (Sociedad de Inversión) to which that employee’s
funds should be sent. It is currently contemplated that each employee
will have only a single fund manager. This general structure seems will
reduce record keepingburdens on employers, reduce the risk ofunder
payment by employers, and permit a wide range of choice by employ
ees. Competition among account administrators wil encourage cost
reduction and quality of service to employers and employees. Competi
tion among fund managers will encourage product innovation, cost
containment, and the quality ofservice to employees and retirees.
An official regulatory body like CONAFORE will approve fund man
agers and their products. Each fund manager would eventually be
permitted to offer a variety ofindividual products so that an employee
can select a mixture ofinvestments (stocks, bonds, money market in
struments) within a single fund manager and shift among types of
investments without the additional administrative expense ofchang
ing fund managers. The restriction on a single fund manager for each
employee could be reexamined in the future as account balances grow.
The CONAFORE or other agency would presumably require fund
managers to provide the public with comparable information on such
things as historie yields, variability, administrative costs, turnover,
etcetera.
A variety of proposals have been made to provide a role for the
¡MSS in the AFORE administration process. An extreme proposal would
give the ¡MSS a monopoly on collecting funds from employers and
choosing the fund managers (instead of allowing each individual
to choose his own fund manager from the approved list.) An ¡MSS
monopoly as account administrator would eliminate the competitive
pressures that would otherwise lead overtime to lower costs and better
service. It would also blur the message that the AFORE accounts are
private investment vehicles that are fundamentally different from the
existing ¡MSS pay-as-you-go system. An ¡MSS monopoly as account
administrator would thus increase the probability of returning to an
unfunded system.
Allowing the ¡MSS to select fund managers instead of permitting
the individuals to do that would have even more serious adverse
effects. Fund managers selling to a government bureaucracy would
not have the same incentives for product innovation, individual client
service, and administrative efficiency that they would have if they
were competing forthe business ofthe individuals themselves. Having
the IMSS select fund managers increases the likelihood ofinvesting to
achieve “social” goals (e.g., geographic distribution, industry distribu
tion, etc.) rather than getting the best risk-adjusted returns for the
AFORE participants. Selection of fund managers by government bu
reaucrats may also be more likely to lead to corruption.
The same arguments against granting a general monopoly to the
IMSS are also relevant to proposais to give ¡MSS a monopoly for certain
classes of employers or employees (e.g., temporary employees or em
ployees in particular high-turnover industries.)
Allowingthe ¡MSS to compete with private account administrators
(to receive funds from employers who select them and forward funds
to the investment managers chosen by individual employees) has also
been suggested. Although the need to compete with other account
administrators in order to be chosen by employers would normally act
to reduce costs and maintain quality ofservice, the IMSS could choose to
cross-subsidize the AFORE account administration business in order
to obtain a larger share ofthe market (since the cross-subsidy would
come from the non-AFORE business where ¡MSS has no competition.)
This would permit a more costly administration. More significantly,
it could lead to a large role for IMSS in the AFORE program, causing
confusion among employees about the nature ofthe AFORE progran
A.6. Administration ofthe AFORE Accounts
1
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A.7. Payment ofAFORE Benefits
When employees reach retirement age, withdrawals from AFORE ac
counts would presumably be restricted so that individuals do not
spend their accumulated savings too quickly either in error or in order
to take advantage ofmeans tested benefits available to older persons
without financial means. A variety ofalternative annuity options and
other payout schemes are possible, with different likely effects of
self-selection by individuals and ofadverse selection by insurers.
Although annuities are an appealing option, the national saving
rate will be higher ifindividuals choose a limited withdrawal schedule
instead and continue to be able to transfer balances in AFORE accounts
at their death to the AFORE accounts ofspouses or children.
A.8. Voluntary Contributions to AFORE Accounts
Since the required AFORE contributions will finance only a partial
replacement ofpreretirement wages, individuals and employers could
also be encouraged to make voluntary contributions to the AFORE
accounts. These could be made directly by individuals or by employers
in connection with company defined contribution pensions or with
voluntary individual saving plans (similar to the US 401k plans).
These possibilities and the use oftax rules to encourage them are discus
sed in more detail in section 1.4 ofthe text.
government safety net for these individuals could be either a means
tested program that provides a fiat benefit financed like other welfare
programs or part of a universal fiat benefit for ah individuals beyond
a certain age. A universal pay-as-you-go benefit (rather than a means
tested benefit) would encourage higher income individuals to save less
and could create political pressures te educe the standard required
AFORE contribution.20
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A.9. Miscellaneous AFORE Issues
Providing increased protection for the population in old age and
increasing national saving would both be enhanced by expandingpar
ticipation in the AFORE program on a voluntary basis to individuals
who are currentlyworking outside the formal structure. Ifin the process
ofcontributing to the AFORE accounts they could also be induced tojoin
the formal sector, theirpayments oftaxes and other IMSS contributions
would significantly increase government revenue and therefore na
tional saving.
Some individuals with low lifetime earnings or low earnings in
the formal sector will inevitably reach retirement age with too little
in their AFORE to finance even a minimal level of consumption. The
20 The AFORE system is linked in practice with the INFONAVIT system of housing finance.
A variety ofalternative changes could lead to a more productive use ofthose funds: 1) Adding the
current annual Housing AFORE contribution (five percent of payroli) to the individual’s Retire
ment AFORE, to be used wither for downpayrnents in the purchase of a horne or for additional
retirement income. 2) Eliminating the Infonavit’s role in funding individual mortgages while
continuing its other funding activities, with the Housing AFORE contributions that now fund
individual mortgages going instead go to the Retirement AFORE and therefore to the general
capital rnarket. 3) Continuing to give all of the Housing AFORE funds to INFONAVIT but shifting
Infonavit’s role with respect to individual mortgages from an originator ofmortgages under the
current complex point system to a financer of rnortgages in the secondary market that are
originated by banks and other private mortgage lenders. 4) Shifting the indexing of rnortgages
from the minirnum wage to sorne average market wage or to the price index used for UDI
calculatjons in order to reduce the randomness of the current subsidy. Raising the real return on Housing AFORE accounts and charging the mortgage borrowers a correspondingly higher rate to finance that return would also increase overali national saving and reduce the bias in favor of housing. The incentive to save would also increase if individuals could make voluntary
contributions to the Housing AFORE accounts and ifthe point system used to qua1ify borrowers for Infonavit mortgages gaye more weight to the funds accurnuiated in the Housing AFORE.
264 265